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THE ROAD NOT TAKEN: SOME THOUGHTS ON
NONMAJORITY EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION
MAT-HEW W.

FINKIN*

In 1919, Woodrow Wilson called for legislation "based upon a full
recognition of the right of those who work... to participate in some
organic way in every decision which directly affects their welfare or
the part they are to play in industry."' The call was made in the wake
of decades of labor unrest, was grounded in the experience of federal
labor policy during the Great War, and drew upon Progressive efforts
at labor reform-for the realization of an "industrial democracy."
But it came to naught. The Republic was to experience another decade and a half of labor unrest, employer resistance, judicial hostility,
and reform efforts before Congress embarked upon the legislative ex2
periment of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).
The "tap-root and trunk ' 3 of the Act is found in section 7, which
guarantees employees the right to "self-organization" and "to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing."'4 The elemental notion embraced by the Act was that the individual employee
acting alone and without assistance could have little influence upon
the employer, and that only through collective representation could
some rough equality be achieved. This statutory proposition, however, was neither novel nor especially controversial: It was taken verbatim from section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act
(NIRA),5 which borrowed from the declaration of policy of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 6 and which, in turn, was prefigured in the princi-

ples adopted by the War Labor Conference Board of 1918. What was
novel-and heavily contested at the time-were the means of realizing that policy, especially on two issues: Congress prohibited em* Albert J.Harno Professor of Law and Professor in the Institute of Labor and Industrial
Relations, University of Illinois.
1. 58 CONG. REc. 40, 41 (1919).
2. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988) [hereinafter Labor
Act].
3. Clyde Summers, Unions Without Majority-A Black Hole?, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 531,
531 (1990).
4. National Labor Relations Act, § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
5. National Industrial Recovery Act, Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933) (declared unconstitutional in Schecter Poultry v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)).
6. Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101115 (1988)).
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ployer interference in or support of a labor organization, as defined
expressly to include "any kind" of employee representation committee or plan; and it established the principle of exclusive representation
by majority rule.
Over the next three decades, and despite the blunting effects of
the Taft-Hartley amendments, that experiment was a modest success:
The bulk of the production workers in major, nationally based manufacturing industries were organized under the Act, and the standards
set in bargaining for these employees-especially the creation of internal labor markets-were widely emulated by nonunion firms.7 But
over the course of the past two decades union density has drastically
declined, to about the same percentage of the private sector non-agricultural work force as at the time the Labor Act was passed.
Although this development has been explained by a variety of factors,
in which the law may or may not play an especially prominent part,
the result has caused a number of observers to return to President
Wilson's plea; to find, as Paul Weiler put it, some alternative means
for "direct indigenous representation." 8
Two broad ideas for legislative reform have been proposed. The
one more discussed calls for the creation of employee works councils,
either by voluntary employer action or as mandated by law such as in
Germany. 9 The one less talked about calls for provision of "members
only" representation. 10 Each, in other words, would unmake one of
the more contested legislative choices made in 1935: The former considerably to modify or repeal the "company union" prohibition;" the
latter to modify or abandon exclusive representation by majority rule.
The former draws not only from European developments but
upon the American experience as well. The stimulation of works
7. See generally SANFORD M. JACOBY, EMPLOYING BUREAUCRACY:
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF WORK IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY,

MANAGERS, UNIONS,

1900-1945 (1985).

8. PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 295 (1990).

9. Id. at 282-95. See also Jamin B. Raskin, Reviving the Democratic Vision of Labor Law,
42 HASTINGS L.J. 1067, 1098-99 (1991) (reviewing Weiler's book); JANICE R. BELLACE, MANDATING EMPLOYEE INFORMATION AND CONSULTATION RIGHTS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-

137 (John F. Burton ed., 1991) and the papers presented by Roy J. Adams, Richard B. Freeman, and Otto Jacobi
and commented on by Joel Rogers in the same proceedings under the heading of "Statutory
Works Councils," id. at 319-48.
THIRD ANNUAL MEETING, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION

10. See Summers, supra note 3. See also Charles McDonald, U.S. Union Membership in
Future Decades: A Trade Unionist's Perspective, 31 INDUS. REL. 13 (1992).
11. Paul C. Weiler & Guy Mundlak, New Directions for the Law of the Workplace, 102
YALE L.J. 1907, 1922 (1993). See also Raymond L. Hogler, Worker Participation,Employer
Anti-Unionism, and Labor Law: The Case of the Steel Industry, 1918-1937, 7 HoFSTRA LAB. L.J.
1, 68-69 (1989).
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councils for otherwise unrepresented employees was federal policy
during World War I. Following that, a number of employers established employee representation plans and committees in the 20s, at
the height of which efforts about ten percent of workers in large manufacturing enterprises were so represented. 12 Employee representation plans were more widely adopted in the 30s as part of
management's response to section 7(a) of the NIRA-resulting in the
Labor Act's "company union" prohibition. Consequently, many of
the same arguments made against that prohibition at the time are
heard again today, especially the need to foster "cooperative" as opposed to "adversarial" labor relations.
But the idea of "members only" representation also draws from
the historical wellspring in practice and, to a limited extent, in law as
well. 13 On the former, the tradition of American "trades unions"
throughout the nineteenth and the early twentieth century was to bargain only for their members; but this was coupled to the demand that
employers hire union members exclusively-hence the sometimes violent struggle over employer demands for the "open shop." On the
latter, under the Principles of the War Labor Conference Board, giving employees the right "to bargain collectively, through chosen representatives," the War Labor Board recognized the right of employees
"through the agency of any union to which they may belong" to select
14
a committee "to represent the union men" in the company's employ.
Following that principle, the idea that the law should authorize unions
to represent those-and only those-who have voluntarily chosen
them was embedded in the text of the Labor Act. Section 7 gives
employees the right to representatives "of their own choosing"-not
of someone else's choosing, whether that someone else is the employer or a group of co-workers. Such was a tenable reading of section 7(a) of the NIRA, until the then National Labor Relations Board
(old) adopted the requirement of majority rule giving the "their" of
"their own choosing" a collective rather than individual reference.' 5
In consequence of the prior reading, however, the Automobile Settlement of March 25, 1934, provided for representation by any organization freely chosen by individual employees, although the Automobile
12. H.M. GITELMAN, LEGACY OF THE LUDLOW MASSACRE 333-34 (1988).
13. See generally Richard R. Carlson, The Origin and Future of Exclusive Representationin
American Labor Law, 30 Duo. L. REv. 779 (1992).
14. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 287, NATIONAL WAR

213 (1992).
15. See Minier Sargent, Majority Rule in Collective BargainingUnder Section 7(a), 29 ILL. L.
REv. 275 (1934).
LABOR BOARD
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Labor Board promptly converted that provision into a kind of super
works council, by a system of proportional representation. 16 But
whatever potential the law might have had to effect a system of
"members only" representation was eliminated by the Labor Act's
embracing the principle of majority rule shortly thereafter. As the
President of the American Federation of Labor's Office Employees
International Union explained:
Prior to the Act, unions were free to organize in whatever manner
they found to be most effective. Frequently, a union would build its
membership in a shop by first organizing a small group of workers
who had the fortitude to stand strong for the union. Upon the organization of such group, certain job improvements would be obtained for them from management. And this working example of
the gains to be achieved through organization frequently formed the
most potent organizational appeal to other workers in the shop, and
they too would join to improve their conditions. Now, trade unions
must conform their organization activities to the appropriate bargaining unit patterns laid down by the Board. They cannot organize
and bargainfor those workers in a plant who are interested in collective bargaining, they must organize and
bargain for all workers
17
within "an appropriatebargainingunit."

In sum, Congress took a provision, borrowing from prior law, that
at the threshold granted to each individual employee the right to his
or her chosen representative, and attached to it a provision requiring
the employer to bargain only with a majority representative. However, the threshold grant of individual rights was not altered by the
provision for majority rule. In the absence of an exclusive representative, concerted activity by work groups for better working conditions
is statutorily protected, and nothing prohibits an employer from contracting with a union for terms applicable only to its members. The
law simply makes no provision requiring employers to deal on that
basis. 18 As a result, the ability of a nonmajority group to require the
employer to deal with it is entirely a function of the group's strategic

16. See AUTOMOBILE LABOR

6, 1935). See generally SIDNEY
(1963).
17. Paul R. Hutchings, Effect on the Trade Union, in THE WAGNER AcT: AFTER TEN
YEARS 72, 73 (Louis G. Silverberg ed., 1945) (emphasis added).
18. Clyde Summers has argued that, "The plain words of section 7, section 8(a)(1) and
section 8(a)(5) would seem to require an employer, in the absence of a majority union to bargain
collectively with a non-majority union for its own members." Summers, supra note 3, at 539. It
is a provocative argument; but it would require an unusually bold Labor Board (and judiciary)
so to hold, against the weight of a contrary conventional wisdom. Accordingly this essay proceeds upon the assumption that legislative action would be required.
BOARD, FINAL REPORT (Aug.

FINE, THE AUTOMOBILE UNDER THE BLUE EAGLE
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situation in the workplace. 19 But an unstrategically situated "bargaining unit" majority would be equally unable to compel the employer to
deal with it, save for the Act's imposition of a duty to bargain. What
follows will examine whether the road not taken in 1935 is worth exploring in the search for an alternative to the current system:
Whether it would make sense today, with the hindsight of the Labor
Act's experience, to think about extending bargaining rights on a
"members only" basis.
The benefits of such an extension were dealt with in a comprehensive (and prescient) study by George Schatzki in 1975 and need
only be briefly rehearsed. 20 All the regulation and delay attendant to
unit determinations, election campaigns, and elections themselves
would be eliminated (as well as the whole body of law surrounding
successorship). Inasmuch as the employer would be required to bargain with any organization on behalf of its members, all the organization need supply to establish a bargaining relationship is a
membership list. (Such, in fact, was part of the 1934 Automobile Settlement.) 21 To be sure, the submission of such a list to the employer
could facilitate anti-union retaliation. But even now, a retaliatory discharge-for example, during the course of union organizing-requires
proof of the employer's knowledge of the employee's union sentiment, membership, or activity; and the potential exacerbation of the
prospect of unlawful employer retaliation only emphasizes the current
need to strengthen legal safeguards against it.
Moreover, in consequence of "members only" representation an
employee would not be forced to be represented either in bargaining
or in the handling of grievances by a representative not of his or her
"own choosing," whether a union elected by a majority under the current law, 22 or an elected works council either mandated by law or es19. For an assessment of how a nonexclusive representative might function under the current state of the law see Alan Hyde et al., After Smyrna: Rights and Powers of Unions that
Represent Less than a Majority, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 637 (1993).
20. George Schatzki, Majority Rule, Exclusive Representation,and the Interestsof Individual
Workers: Should Exclusivity Be Abolished?, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 897 (1975).
21. The lists, however, were submitted not to the employer but to the Automobile Labor
Board, and the several difficulties with their use were obviated by the electoral machinery for
proportional representation adopted by the Board. FINE, supra note 16, at 260-61. One difficulty was the fact that some employees joined more than one organization; but that could be
dealt with by requiring the employee to make an election of membership for representation
purposes in one organization only, failing which he or she would be considered unrepresented.
22. The fact that under majority rule a union selected by the slimmest of margins was required to represent employees unsympathetic or hostile to it-and to preclude their separate
representation-continued to vex critics well after the Act's passage, to the point of an argument
for a partial accommodation by requiring the Board to exclude from any bargaining unit em-
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tablished unilaterally by the employer. Professor Schatzki dwells at
some length on the implications of a true voluntarism, but to oversimplify, the prospect is likely to be one of greater individual participation and organizational responsiveness.
The arguable disadvantages of the proposal are two, both of
which harken back to the debate over majority rule: The first goes to
the issue of union bargaining power; the second goes to the employer's ability to bargain on a "members only" basis.23 The first is
concerned that nonmajority unions will be weaker in their dealing
with employers relative to the power they can wield as exclusive representatives. The second is concerned that employers will be unable
to deal efficiently with a multiplicity of different organizations representing otherwise fungible employees; it conjures up the spectre of
three operatives working side-by-side performing identical tasks
under common supervision and working conditions being represented
by three different organizations. Each of these should be taken in
turn.

The ability of a "members only" representative more sharply to
focus shared concerns would be offset by a lessened ability to command a broader front in dealing with the employer. But a similar caution has been made with respect to bargaining unit determinations
under the existing Act,24 and that has not deterred the Board from
finding units of relatively narrow congruent interests to be appropriate-for example, just the food service workers in a single outlet of a
25
large retail chain like F.W. Woolworth.
Moreover, it remains to be seen how effective the solidarity of
coerced representation really is. The United States Supreme Court
has limited a union's ability to command the financial support of the
ployees of a craft, class, department or plant division that had evidenced less than thirty percent
support for the union. THEODORE R. ISERMAN, INDUSTRIAL PEACE AND THE WAGNER AcT 78-

79 (1947).
23.

See LEVERETr S. LYON ET AL., THE NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION 539

(1935):
Majority rule in collective bargaining is justified by experience, which proves that collective bargaining is nullified in practice wherever the workers are divided. Majority
rule is also necessitated by the fact that labor standards cannot be properly set for all
the workers of a plant, craft, or industry, if different sets of representatives bargain at
the same time with the same employer.
24.

ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 68 (1976).

25. F.W. Woolworth Co., 144 N.L.R.B. 307 (1963). So, too, has the Board found to be
appropriate a unit of only the meat department employees of a single outlet of a grocery chain,
NLRB v. Joe B. Foods, Inc., 953 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1992), and of only the "front desk" employees
of a hotel, Dinah's Hotel Corp., 295 N.L.R.B. 1100 (1989), which may, again, be part of a chain.
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bargaining unit.26 And in the strike situation, where solidarity is a
necessary (if not sufficient) condition of economic power, the emphasis placed by the United States Supreme Court on the individual right
to break with the strike and on the employer's privilege to induce
breach of solidarity27 weakens the argument to the bargaining
strength of majority representation.
Some of the reservations about the current system can be illustrated by a relatively recent and altogether unremarkable decision,
Continental Web Press,Inc. v. NLRB. 28 In 1980, a union petitioned to
represent a unit of thirty-six pressmen in a lithographic printing plant.
The Company argued that the unit should include seven preparatory
employees. The Regional Director decided the unit petitioned for
was appropriate and ordered an election. The union won the election
19 to 11, with 6 not voting, but the Company sought Board review. In
1982, the Board sustained the Regional Director, relying upon the different training (apprenticeship), supervision and work hours of the
two groups and the lack of interchange between them. 29 The employer, however, refused to bargain on the ground that the unit was
inappropriate. The union filed a charge of unfair labor practice, and
in 1983 the Board ordered the employer to bargain. 30 The employer
then sought review in the court of appeals. The court opined that had
the case been one of first impression, a separate pressmen's unit might
well have been appropriate; but the Board had held in other cases that
preparatory employees and pressmen were part of a continuous lithographic process, which, by analogy, would mean that the Board in this
case had placed the employees at the beginning of an assembly line in
one unit and those at the end in another. 31 And so-four years after
the election-the court applied that principle of administrative law requiring the Board adequately to explain a departure from established
precedent, or to announce its reasons more fully were it to be adopting a new policy, and remanded for the Board's reconsideration.
One is driven to inquire whether something is not amiss in these
events: Why should the 19 of 36 pressmen who desire union represen26. See generally Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Union Security Agreements Under the National
Labor Relations Act: The Statute, the Constitution, and the Court's Opinion in Beck, 27 HARV. J.
oN LEGmS. 51 (1990).

27. See, e.g., Matthew W. Finkin, Labor Policy and the Enervation of the Economic Strike,

1990 U.
28.
29.
30.

ILL. L. REv. 547.
742 F.2d 1087 (7th Cir. 1984).
Continental Web Press, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 1395 (1982).
Continental Web Press, Inc., 266 N.L.R.B. 841 (1983).

31. Continental Web Press, Inc., 742 F.2d at 1091.
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tation be denied that representation because seven nonpressmen were
not included in the unit? Even if the pressmen constituted "an" appropriate unit, as the court conceded could be the case, would a union
with 19 supporters of 36 in the unit (with 11 hostile and 6 arguably
indifferent) be measurably stronger as a representative of the entire
unit than one that represents only its members? If the union had lost
the election in a pressmen's unit-15 for, 15 against, and 6 not voting-why should those fifteen be denied a representative "of their
own choosing" because an equal number of their co-workers were
contrary minded (and six arguably indifferent)? And even if the
union in both these cases is in a weaker bargaining position representing only its members than it would be representing all the pressmenwhich is by no means obvious-neither is it obvious that employees
are better off in the aggregate with the current "high stakes" game,
which encourages employer resistance and litigation and in which unions secure majority support less than half the time,32 than with a
"lower stakes" game that assures representation automatically to all
those who desire it even if their bargaining position may be of less33
ened strength.
The more difficult or, at least, perplexing problem is the prospect
of a proliferation of organizations each demanding to bargain for its
members over the same subjects and to which the employer would
owe an equal duty to bargain in good faith. The difficulty will be discussed presently. But the perplexity derives from the Act's misleading
vocabulary and from the want of any statutory guidance on the question of bargaining structure.
The Act speaks in terms of exclusive representation of "an appropriate bargaining unit"-the group of jobs the union represents. But,
what the Board in reality is determining is an appropriate election unit
for the designation of a bargaining agent, which may or may not coincide with the group of jobs actually represented at the bargaining table. From this perspective, the function of the "community of
interests" test the Board applies to decide unit questions is only partly
a concern for management's ease of bargaining and more importantly
one of assuring sufficient homogeneity of employee interests for the
purpose of selecting an exclusive representative and minimizing the
32. In 1990 the NLRB ran 4,210 representation elections. Unions won 1,965 of them-or
46.7 percent. The total vote over the fiscal year was about 108,000 employees voting for unions
and 121,000 against. 55 NLRB ANN. REP. 11 (1992).
33. Cf. McDonald, supra note 10, at 27-28.
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number of conflicting interests the representative might be called
34
upon to reconcile.
In the case of the Woolworth outlet adverted to earlier, the union
sought a unit of only the food service workers, and the employer insisted that only a unit of all the store's employees would be appropriate. Accordingly, the Board attended to differences in work,
supervision, and working conditions as well as to similarities in wages,
benefits, and personnel policies to decide whether or not the unit petitioned for represented a true community of interests. But at no point
does either the Board majority or the dissenting Board members advert to how an enormous national retail chain, with over a thousand
outlets, is to bargain effectively over wages, medical insurance, pension benefits, and seniority (including transfer and "bumping" rights)
with either a representative of the employees of just a single store or
of only that single store's food service workers; nor does the Board
contemplate the Company's situation were it required to bargain with
representatives of potentially thousands of such units.
The Board's silence is not surprising for it mirrors the statute's
silence on this point. The duty to bargain under the Act requires the
employer to send a representative to the bargaining table with power
to make an agreement; thus, the selection of a union by the single
outlet's food service workers compels the employer to bargain on
company-wide policies such as wages, hours, and benefits. But the
Act is silent about, is unconcerned with, how the employer is to do
that. Consequently, the practical difficulty for "members only" representation flows from the Act's lack of concern with bargaining
structure.
Under the current state of the law, a union may attempt to rationalize the structure of bargaining for the various units it represents. If
it is selected at food service counters elsewhere in the company, it may
propose to bargain for them all as a single unit; but it may not insist
upon that demand for such an alteration in "the bargaining unit" is
only a permissive bargaining subject. If the Company agrees, however, the union may negotiate a single company-wide contract even
though it was elected counter by counter, store by store. In that case,
the actual "bargaining unit" will transcend the election districts from
which the union derived its bargaining rights. Further, a group of unions representing different groups of the employer's employees may
form a coalition and bargain jointly with the employer; but they may
34.

GORMAN,

supra note 24, at 67-68.
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not insist that the employer bargain on that basis for that too would
alter "the bargaining unit" which the Board determined to be appropriate.35 For the same reason, neither may the employer insist upon
joint bargaining. In the Woolworth example, the employer could not
insist upon meeting jointly with the separate representatives of the
food service workers and store clerks to negotiate a common issue
such as seniority in consequence of employee interchange. 36 Nor may
either party condition agreement in one unit upon the satisfactory
conclusion of negotiations for another unit. 37 Thus the prospect of a
variety of organizations-some affiliated with national labor organizations, some entirely indigenous-each representing its own members,
each desiring to bargain about employer policies that may affect them
in common, each owed a duty to bargain in good faith by the employer has the potential of exacerbating the difficulties an employer
would face under the current state of the law, where it might be required to bargain with a variety of unions, each the exclusive representative of one or more of a number of bargaining units.
One can be skeptical that the actual number of organizations demanding to bargain for their members would be outlandish. A recent
study based on the empirical and theoretical literature has concluded
that, "[C]ollective action tends to happen when a critical mass of in'38
terested and resourceful individuals can coordinate their efforts.
And it remains to be seen how many such critical masses there are in a
given workplace, or how sustainable a number of organizations can be
on a given potential membership base. (If multiplicity were considered to be a serious potential problem, the statute could require that
organizational membership reach a certain practicable level as a condition of recognition, perhaps as a minimum percentage. of the
39
workforce in the establishment, division, department, class or craft.)
35. See generally WILLIAM N. CHERNISH, COALITION BARGAINING (1969). However, each

of the unions in the coalition may sit with one another's bargaining committee as a technical
representative of the then bargaining union. General Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 512 (2d Cir.
1969).
36. F.W. Woolworth Co., 179 N.L.R.B. 748 (1969).
37. See United Paperworkers Int'l Union Eriez Local 620 (International Paper Co.), 309
N.L.R.B. 44 (1992) (applying this principle to a "pooled voting ratification procedure"). For
criticism of the decision (and the doctrine) in the context of the precise labor dispute in question
see Julius G. Getman & F. Ray Marshall, Industrial Relations in Transition: The Paper Industry
Example, 102 YALE L.J. 1803 (1993).

A

38. GERALD MARWELL & PAMELA OLIVER, THE CRITICAL MASS IN COLLECTIVE ACTON:
MICRO-SOCIAL THEORY 123 (1993).

39. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R. 521 (1959-1963). It provided for recognition

of an employee organization in the federal service as the exclusive representative of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit upon designation by a majority of those employees. But it
also provided for "formal recognition" short of exclusive bargaining rights of an organization "as
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Nonetheless, nonmajority representation may complicate conduct of
bargaining and arguably heighten the potential of whipsawing or leapfrogging by different organizations. In other words, explicit provision
for "members only" representation would bring to the fore an issue
currently imbedded in but ignored by the Labor Act. And although it
is likely that employers and unions would work out the practical
problems of bargaining structure without statutory attention, just as
they do now-either by bargaining consensually on a multi-union basis or by a "pattern" bargain with a single union which is then insisted
upon by the employer in bargaining with the others-the potential
exacerbation of the problem argues for legislative facilitation of the
bargaining process; that is, for a coalition-accommodating and, if need
be, a coalition-forcing statutory provision. 4°
If one were to fashion a statute that accepted the principle of
majority rule but required that units be configured to relatively narrow sets of congruent interests, an analogous problem of a potential
proliferation of bargaining obligations would be presented. Such a
statute was drafted to deal with a rather more rarified question in
public sector collective bargaining; 41 but the approach it took would
seem to be applicable to the possible proliferation of bargaining obligations under a system of "members only" representation. Assuming
that section 9(a) were amended so to require, section 8(a)(5) could be
amended as follows:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with a representative of his
employees; but it shall not be an unfair labor practicethe representative of its members" in a unit defined by the governmental agency when inter alia
it has "a substantial and stable membership" of at least ten percent of the employees in the unit.
Such a provision arguably could invite litigation much like the current determination of an
"appropriate bargaining unit." But an "establishment" is a fairly well-defined entity for federal
wage and hour law purposes. 29 C.F.R. § 779.23 (1992). Unlike the multifactored test for what
is an appropriate unit, what constitutes an employer's own "department" or "division" would
seem to be a much simpler determination; and only less so what constitutes a "class" or "craft."
Thus challenges on the ground of insufficient membership or level of subscription would be

likely to arise only on the margin; and the incentive to such challenges would be reduced by
strengthening the remedies for wrongful refusal to bargain, a much needed reform irrespective
of any change in majority rule.
40. Professor Schatzki observes that unions could engage in coalition bargaining and that
employers could be required to deal with them on that basis. Schatzki, supra note 20, at 919.
But he does not attend to what a coalition-forcing mechanism would be, save for suggesting on
the issue of seniority that the contract made with the first union be made to serve as a pattern.
Id. at 936.
41. David E. Feller & Matthew W. Finkin, Legislative Issues in Faculty Collective Bargain-

ing, in
1977).

FACULTY BARGAINING IN PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION

74 (Carnegie Council Series
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(a) for two or more labor organizations to demand joint
bargaining with an employer with respect to matters which
have customarily been provided on a uniform basis among the
employees represented by such organizations; or,
(b) for an employer (i) to demand joint bargaining by two
or more organizations with respect to matters which have customarily been provided on a uniform basis among the employees represented by such labor organizations, or (ii) if joint
bargaining is not agreed to by those organizations or no agreement is reached acceptable to all parties, to conclude an agreement as to such matter with the organization or organizations
which represent the largest number of employees and to refuse
to bargain further with any other organizations as to such matters unless that
other organization agrees to accept the terms so
42
negotiated.
These provisions give the employee representatives and the employer the power directly to confront and to rationalize the bargaining
structure. Subparagraph (a) makes joint bargaining a mandatory bargaining subject. Inasmuch as the statutory concern is for the employer's ability to bargain, the employer need not be required to
bargain with a coalition; but where the employee representatives fear
an effort to play one off against another, it permits the different organizations to require the employer directly to confront the issue. Subparagraph (b) is concerned with the reverse situation, where the
employer sees the need to rationalize its bargaining structure and the
representatives prove resistant. Accordingly, the proposed provision
gives the employer the power to impose a coalition in the face of such
recalcitrance. But both are limited to issues that have customarily
been settled on a uniform basis, to preserve separate negotiations on
matters of particular interest to the organization that raise no issue of
common concern. Thus the operation of subparagraph (b) has been
explained by its drafter:
[It] makes clear that the employer cannot, after joint bargaining,
take advantage of the permissible pattern bargain by settling with
the weaker organizations (at least in terms of the total number of
employees represented) and imposing that settlement on the
stronger. For the same reason the employer cannot impose terms
on an organization to which the demand for joint bargaining had
not been directed or which had not been a participant in unsuccessful joint bargaining. The provision does, however, give real meaning to the joint bargaining procedure, because a settlement with a
coalition representing the largest number could be binding even on
the nonconsenting representative of the single largest... [member42. Id. at 161. This draft accordingly omits the current requirement-"subject to the provi-

sions of section 9(a)"-in section 8(a)(5).
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ship]. As a result, the bargaining agents are under considerable
pressure to43 come together and arrive at a mutually acceptable
resolution.

The proposal has its most obvious application where the several
organizations represent members in work groups who conceive of
themselves as uniquely situated or as having special concerns-those
who might be subsumed in a more heterogeneous bargaining unit determined to be appropriate by the Labor Board. But even if one were
to speculate that employees doing otherwise the same work fer the
same pay and under the same supervision might choose different organizations to represent them, such would seem possible because
these organizations successfully appeal to different workplace concerns. It would be possible, arguably, for employees to segregate
themselves into organizations emphasizing divergent interests, for example, of health insurance and pensions for the older, of job training
and retraining for the younger, of flextime and child care, especially
for female employees with young children, and of safety in certain
hazardous jobs. Even in such a speculative situation, a coalition-forcing provision would compel these groups to make compromises with
one another in order to achieve an overall package on matters of common policy.
However, the availability of self-segregating organizations holds
open the possibility for a variety of "civil rights" organizations to assert the interests of their members. 44 This may well give pause, for the
argument runs that the opening of a channel for these groups separately to assert their members' "voice" would virtually insure that it
would be utilized. And while added "voice" is often to be welcomed,
45
too much voice-like too much exit-may become dysfunctional.
Under the current state of the law, the bargaining agent is required to accommodate the unit's various interests and desires in fashioning its bargaining demands and trade-offs, subject to external
accountability under a statutory duty of fair representation, in which
intra-organizational accommodation the employer has nothing to say.
What is different today from when the duty of fair representation was
43. Id. at 163-64. The statutory provision and the analysis were drafted by David Feller who
is not responsible for its extension into this setting.
44. Professor Schatzki acknowledges the prospect of racial self-segregation. Schatzki, supra
note 20, at 933-34. That such is a distinct possibility see Black Grievance Comm. v. NLRB, 749
F.2d 1072 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1008 (1985).
45. ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, Exrr, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 31 (1970) ("But voice is like exit
in that it can be overdone: the discontented ... could become so harassing that their protests
would at some point hinder rather than help .... ").
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created in 1944, to deal with a racial distinction drawn by collective
agreement, is a proliferation in the number of groups with statutory
rights to assert in the workplace-on grounds of sex, ethnicity, religion, age, physical and mental handicap, citizenship and lawful immigration status in addition to race-and the emergence of other groups
identifying themselves as needful of similar solicitude, most prominently on grounds of sexual orientation.
To see how this might complicate the contemporary workplace,
contemplate the situation where a number of Spanish-speaking employees desire to converse with one another in that tongue even as
other English-only speakers-perhaps African Americans-feel put
off by the use of that language, possibly feeling themselves to be the
object of comment (or ridicule) they do not understand. Their desire
for an "English only" rule on company premises is strongly resisted by
the Spanish-speakers. Now play out the possibility of such competing
claims on racial, ethnic and sexual grounds to training and promotion
opportunities, to claims for out-of-seniority accommodation to religious observance and physical handicap, and on down an expanding
list of potential claims and claimants, and the "civil rights" scenario
becomes a sobering one entirely apart from the additional regulation
of some of these issues by civil rights law.
The argument derives its considerable force from the depiction of
a multiplicity of competing interest groups clamoring to be heard. But
if that is so, if all these conflicting claims are nascent in the workplace,
the question presented is whether it makes sense to continue to call
upon a single exclusive employee representative to reconcile them.
There is much to be said for a model of minorities successfully negotiating their differences with one another. But if "too much" voice may
harass an employer, it is at lkast equally possible that too much voice
internal to an employee organization may place more burdens upon
its political processes than it reasonably should be asked to
accommodate.
It is true that under "members only" representation, employees
who believe they would be better represented separately could insist
on dealing with the employer (subject, if need be, to some minimum
membership requirement). 46 But this may suggest in return that such
groups should be heard if they desire, and that the responsibility for
orchestrating their claims may rest just as well if not better with the
46. See supra note 39.

19931

NONMAJORITY EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION

employer, subject to its invocation of the proposed coalition-forcing
provision.
The shifting of this responsibility to the employer raises a related
concern. Under the instant proposal, a collective representative
would be free to set its own membership requirements so long as it
does not violate any civil rights law. It could not, for example, refuse
to admit African Americans, Mexican Americans, women, or the like.
But it could restrict membership to those who perform certain tasks or
who have certain training; and there is no reason why it could not also

require a certain level of skill. The consequence may give separate
''voice" to the more highly skilled and better trained-those whom
the employer might be most anxious to retain (and reward) but whose
voice would be submerged in larger noncraft bargaining units-and
who may be better positioned to exact a wage premium (or "rent") at
the expense of those less skilled or less in demand.47 This, in turn,
may contribute to the widening of the wage inequality that the Repub48
lic has experienced over the past decade or two.
If this consequence was thought relevant to the fashioning of a
system of employee representation, we could regulate the member-

ship policies of employee representatives to blunt these effects; to require, for example, that an organization that admits any employee of
an employer admit all employees of that employer. 49 But that approach would cut against the principle of free association that under-

girds nonexclusive representation. It would also require a reintroduction of some externally imposed notion of statutory fair representation that the instant proposal eliminates.50
47. Professor Schatzki confronted this possibility, see supra note 20, at 933:
For example, skilled workers may be prepared to work for no less than, say, eight dollars an hour. But they may hope for nine dollars, and might be able to realize that
greater salary if they are able to negotiate on their own; the employer could then compensate by offering less to the unskilled workers, who are more easily replaced if they
are not satisfied with the employer's pay scale. Under the present state of affairs, with
skilled employees merged in collective bargaining units with less skilled or more easily
replaced employees, the union may aim only for the eight dollar figure, on the thesis
that the skilled employees will be minimally satisfied and more will be left over for the
unskilled workers. If one has some concern for the status and rewards of the less able,
skilled, or fortunate workers, the consequence I describe should be unsettling.
48. W. Norton Grubb & Robert H. Wilson, Sources of IncreasingInequality in Wages and
Salaries, 1960-80, MONTHLY LAB. REV., April 1989, at 3; Paul Ryscavage & Peter Henle, Earnings Inequality Accelerates in the 1980's, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Dec. 1990, at 3.

49. This is the approach taken by Professor Schatzki, supra note 20, at 920.
50. This is not to suggest that unions would have no externally imposed limit on their treatment of their members. But such would derive from the general law governing the internal
affairs of membership organizations and not from the Labor Act. Cf. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The
Internal Affairs of Associations Not For Profit, 43 HARV. L. REV. 993 (1930). Nor should the
Landrum-Griffin Act, requiring union democracy, be affected.
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Alternatively, one could require the fundamentals of the wage
bargain to be centrally set at a supra-enterprise level as is done in
some European countries, of which Sweden is probably the most well
known.51 But that would require a massive change in American law
and practice of dubious workability; even Sweden has experienced
"wage drift"-an increase in wages at the firm level beyond the cen52
trally set contractual standard.
What remains to be seen is whether the incomes inequality problem ought to be addressed through the statutory structure of employee representation. If one conceives of the collectively bargained
wage as a means of distributing the total wage sum among differing
groups in society, then the call to statutory concern would make a lot
of sense-in fact, the call should be for mandatory unionization and a
centralized bargaining structure. But at the enterprise level the wage
may be a tool for the effective organization of work, even a system of
reward for work that bears some relationship to productivity. The giving of "voice" to the better trained and more highly skilled might well
widen the wage differential within organized firms; but it might also
conduce toward greater productivity-else why would employers
more readily accede to these demands than those of the unskilledand possibly encourage the unskilled to undertake more training.
Thus the "wage gap" argument is a reprise of the conventional
solution to the "civil rights" problem: In that case, to place the burden of reconciling conflicting ethnic claimants on the union, so to filter them in the process; in this case, to resolve the "wage gap"
problem by the same means, in the sure and certain hope that a
majoritarian body will tend to compress the wage for the better skilled
relative to the larger number of un- and semi-skilled.5 3 There is one
difference between the two, but it only emphasizes the role the submergence of interest plays; that is, the terms of the bargain in the former case must withstand scrutiny under the civil rights laws. But no
such scrutiny is afforded in the latter. In fact, the Supreme Court has
explained that "[t]he workman is free, if he values his own bargaining
position more than that of the group, to vote against representation
....- What that workman is not given is the privilege to associate
51. See Lei Delsen & Tom van Veen, The Swedish Model: Relevant for Other European
Countries?,30 BRrr. J. OF INDUS. REL. 83 (1992).
52. Hans-G6ran Myrdal, The Hard Way from a Centralised to a Decentralised Industrial
Relations System-The Case of Sweden and SAF, in EMPLOYERS' ASSOCIATIONS IN EUROPE:

POLICY AND OROANISATION 191 (Dieter Sadowski & Otto Jacobi eds., 1991).
53.

See supra note 47.

54. J.I. Case, Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 339 (1944).
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only with others who value their bargaining position equally with his,
in contradistinction to membership in a governmentally defined bargaining unit. The result was supported in the debate on majority rule
by an analogy of industrial to political democracy: Just as a Congressman represents all the voters in the Congressional district, including
those who voted for her opponent or who didn't bother to vote at all,
so does the representative elected by a majority of the bargaining unit.
But the analogy is flawed: Residence in an electoral district represented by a disiiked politician does not preclude those voters from
banding together financially and in other ways to support other members of the same deliberative body who may be sympathetic to their
views. Those residents may also lobby the executive or legislative
branches in opposition to "their own" representative's position.
Neither channel is available under the system of exclusive representation: No other workplace representative is allowed for dissatisfied
employees to influence; nor may they effectively deal with their employer to advance a position contrary to that of the exclusive representative. Collective bargaining under the Labor Act is a form of
industrial democracy; but it is a one-party State. 55
If a consequence of an authentic freedom of workplace association is to contribute to a widening of wage disparities, and if that consequence is of concern to the body politic (as it well may), the better
approach would be for the body politic to confront the issue of wage
inequality directly-perhaps via a national incomes policy-and not
to compel workers to be represented by organizations they do not
want or who may not want to represent them.
Thus far this excursion has assumed for simplicity's sake that
whatever pluralism emerges in employee representation at the plant
or office would occur more or less simultaneously. But the duty to
bargain might arise sequentially. Return, for example, to the Continental Web Press case and assume that after negotiations have been
concluded with organization A, binding only on its members, organization B is formed and insists upon different terms. Because B could
not have been subject to an employer demand for joint bargaining, the
Company could not refuse to bargain with it. But the Company could
insist upon the terms agreed with organization A. Were it to agree to
better terms with B, it would in effect be deciding which is to be the
55. Nor is this state of affairs mitigated by the intramural political structure of most unions.
See Clyde W. Summers, Democracy in a One-Party State: Perspectives from Landrum-Griffin, 43
MD. L. REV. 93 (1984).
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dominant organization. To be sure, A's "no strike" obligation would
bind only its members. Consequently, in this sequential bargaining
scenario B would be free to strike were the Company to insist on the
pattern made with A.56 But in simultaneous bargaining, a nondominant organization would be equally free to strike in an effort to secure
better terms than those agreed upon with the dominant organization
or coalition. In other words, the "sequential bargaining" scenario
does not differ greatly from the situation an employer faces under the
current state of the law when it bargains with a number of organizations who differ among themselves as to which will be the pattern
setter.
The prospect of sequential bargaining obligations ripening as new
organizations emerge raises a question: How is the employer to carry
on its day-to-day operations when the duty to bargain in good faith
imposes a limit upon the employer's ability to take unilateral action
over bargainable subject matter pending the exhaustion of its bargaining obligation? This would be a serious concern if a statute were configured to require the exhaustion of a "meet and confer" obligation
with any organization claiming to represent any members of a bargaining unit before any change could be made in terms and conditions
of employment for the unit as a whole. But, the sequential ripening of
nonmajority bargaining obligations would not seem to differ materially from the situation a company-say, Woolworth-would face as
various bargaining units-say, each of its food counters-proceed to
unionize over time. The bargain struck with one organization representing either only its members or a bargaining unit would be binding
upon those it covers; and the terms agreed to might be extended unilaterally by the employer to nonrepresented employees. But
whatever the existing employment terms are, they constitute the status quo to which the unilateral action rule would apply as new organizations secure bargaining rights, just as they do now.
To be sure, were a hundred or more tiny and so economically
unsustainable organizations-of, say, two or three employees eachsequentially to demand to represent themselves, the unilateral action
rule would significantly hobble the employer's ability to act-so significantly, in fact, that it would be a virtual certainty that the exception to the rule would be held to apply, allowing the employer to act
56. So, too, might A, in cautious anticipation of any new organization emerging, negotiate a
"me too" clause that would give it the benefit of any better bargain struck with another
organization.
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out of business necessity.57 But the mere theoretical possibility of
such a scenario should not lend credence to it as a likely reality: Why
would three hundred production workers feel it necessary-or useful-to form a hundred organizations? In any event, if an excess of
legislative caution were thought prudent, that potential could be dealt
with along the line of a mandatory minimum membership.
A final aspect of the workability of "members only" representation concerns not negotiation but contract application and administration, for it contemplates a system where organizations represent not
jobs, as under the current system, but people. Return to Continental
Web Press and assume that in addition to organization A, which represents nineteen pressmen, organization B represents the eleven pressmen who were hostile to A (for whatever reason) as well as three
preparatory workers, and that each is statutorily entitled to represent
its members. How is it possible for the employer to give better terms
to A than to B, or to A and B but not to extend these terms to the
unrepresented without violating section 8(a)(3), which forbids discrimination in terms and conditions of employment to encourage or
discourage union membership? And if the grievances of A's and B's
members are presumably to be dealt with through the grievance arbitration provisions of their respective representative's agreements, how
are the unrepresented nonmembers to be dealt with? In other words,
for these purposes must there not have to be some notion of a "bargaining unit"-a cluster of common jobs subject accordingly to common treatment?
Under the existing statutory regime, differences in terms and conditions of employment between represented employees, or between
the represented and the unrepresented, that reflect the respective bargaining powers of the organizations and are not rooted in an intent to
favor one union over another or to sanction the represented in favor
of the unrepresented do not work a violation of section 8(a)(3). 58 It is
possible for one group of employees-Woolworth's food service
workers-to unionize while another, their fellow retail clerks, do not.
As a result, the former may secure improvements and protections the
latter do not then enjoy, even though they heretofore had the same
pay scale, hours, and benefits, had some interchange of duties, and
worked in the same location under the same store management. And
57. See George Schatzki, The Employer's Unilateral Act-A Per Se Violation-Sometimes,
44 TEx. L. REV. 470 (1966).
58. See generally Soule Glass & Glazing Co. v. NLRB, 652 F.2d 1055, 1077-78 (1st Cir.
1981).
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per contra an employer may pay its nonunionized workers at a higher
rate than the unionized,5 9 even where it is entirely conceivable that
the two groups could have comprised "an" appropriate bargaining
unit, 6° where, that is, the major distinction between the two is the fact
of unionization. Neither does it violate the Act for an employer to
institute welfare or pension benefits that exclude unionized workers
from coverage on that basis alone, so long as the employer has not
instituted the benefits to defeat the union and does not preclude the
union from bargaining for them. 61 In other words, as the Labor Act
currently stands, a cluster of common jobs may nevertheless be disaggregated for unit purposes along the lines of more narrowly focused
communities of interests. 62 This in turn may result in different terms
and conditions of employment for persons who had been governed by
common terms heretofore, which differences derive from the fact of
such separate representation.
In a sense, a great many unions already bargain on a nonmajority
basis to the extent the units they represent (albeit on an exclusive basis) comprise a minority of the employer's eligible employees or a minority even within alternative configurations of appropriate
bargaining units. Consequently, bargaining on a nonmajority, "members only" basis should pose little difficulty for reconciliation with section 8(a)(3). 63
But most important, under the proposed statutory provision the
Company is given the power to assure that the similarly situated are in
fact treated similarly if it desires (or where antidiscrimination law requires)-in the lithographical hypothetical, by insisting on a coalition,
59. Cf. Viacom Cablevision, 267 N.L.R.B. 1141 (1983) (no unfair labor practice for employer to call a meeting of its unionized workers to inform them of the better wages and benefits
paid to their nonunion counterparts).
60. Cf. Lennox Indus., 308 N.L.R.B. 1237 (1992) (breaking up what had been a single bargaining unit not due to any change in the work but because of the employer's organizational
restructuring).
61. See Dallas Morning News, 285 N.L.R.B. 807 (1987); Fabric Warehouse, 294 N.L.R.B.
189 (1989), aff'd, 901 F.2d 669 (1990).
62. But section 9(c)(5), added in 1947, provides that in determining the unit appropriate for
bargaining, "the extent to which the employees have organized shall not be controlling." 29
U.S.C. § 159(c)5 (1988).
63. See NLRB v. Reliable Newspaper Delivery, Inc., 187 F.2d 547 (3d Cir. 1951) (refusing
to sustain a section 8(a)(3) violation where a minority union, bargaining only for its members,
secured a retroactive pay raise that was not extended by the employer to nonmember employees). It should follow that a collective agreement could not forbid an employer from extending
its gains to nonmembers. Nor can an employer agree to prefer union members over nonmembers as such in a layoff. Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954); NLRB v. Erie
Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963). But the employer could agree with a "members only" representative (or coalition) upon the configuration of the unit within which seniority would operate and to extend that definition unilaterally to the unrepresented.
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failing which it could settle with organization A and effectively impose
those terms on organization B, to assure that the terms accorded to
the pressmen via each of their organizations are substantially the
same. (However, the Company would be required to bargain separately with organization B for any special terms or conditions pertaining only to the three preparatory workers.) And, as. a practical matter
the employer is free, and would be expected to extend the negotiated
terms-putting the grievance procedure aside-to the technically "unrepresented" nonmember pressmen and preparatory empioyees
respectively.
Inasmuch as the unrepresented are likely to benefit from
whatever is secured by the bargaining representative (or coalition),
and because there could be no compulsory dues for nonmembers, a
question remains of whether such a system would not encounter an
insuperable "free rider" problem. But with a sufficient "critical mass"
of participants, 64 the fact of free riding would not seem to disable an
otherwise economically sustainable representative organization to a
significantly greater extent than does the current system where the
gains of an exclusive representative may be extended by the employer
to its "free riding" nonunionized employees. In addition, the major
difference between the represented and the unrepresented would be
the grievance-arbitration procedure available only to the member as a
swift, inexpensive, and effective means of enforcing contract rights.
To be sure, the employer is free unilaterally to establish a grievancearbitration procedure for the unrepresented, 65 so long as it does not
violate section 7 in so doing.66 But the one critical feature that such a
procedure would lack is the institutional presence and participation of
the employee's representative organization-its expertise, indepen-

64. See MARWELL &

OLIVER,

supra note 38, at 101:

[S]imultaneous coordinated action is modeled as an all-or-none contract. The organizer is conceived as asking others to participate in a risk-free agreement to make contributions if enough others also agree.... [G]roup members will agree to contribute if
the total benefit they would experience from the "contract" exceeds their own share of
the cost .... [Tihe model would ... apply to any small group whose members have

decided to pool their resources and act in concert, as if they were one complex person.
65. See generally Samuel Estreicher, Arbitration of Employment Disputes Without Unions,
66 CHI.-KErrr L. REv. 753 (1990).
66. Cf. NLRB v. Stone, 125 F.2d 752, 756 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 649 (1942) (find-

ing individual agreement to submit "all complaints and disputes" to "final" arbitration constitutes a per se violation of the Labor Act). Compare Matthew W. Finkin, Commentary on
"Arbitrationof Employment Disputes Without Union," 66 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 799 (1990) with
Samuel Estreicher, Reply to Professor Finkin, 66 CHi.-KE, L. REV. 817 (1990), on the role of

section 8(a)(2) in regulating nonunion arbitration plans.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:195

dence, and resources. 67 Moreover, the right to participate in the organization's decision-making, to influence the terms of the bargain,
flows exclusively from membership. These lawful differences between
members and nonmembers should tend to mitigate the free rider
problem.
Last, but of no small significance, nonmajority representation
holds open a degree of flexibility arguably better attuned to the contemporary workplace. As the Foreword to this Symposium points out,
the Nation is now legislatively committed to a variety of workplace
protections, and the common law has recognized employee dignityreputation, privacy, and emotional well-being-as legally protected
interests. But these legislative goals and societal values depend upon
the happenstance of administrative intervention or individual litigation for their vindication. If society is serious about realizing them,
there would seem to be no more effective means than well informed,
adequately financed, and truly independent employee organizations
active in the shop or office. Take, for example, the earlier discussion
of the emergence of a critical mass of employees concerned only with
a single workplace issue such as pensions. Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, which regulates both welfare and pension benefits, an employer is under no obligation to inform benefit
plan participants of its intention to alter or even to abrogate a benefit,
68
let alone any obligation to bargain with them about such change.
The United States Supreme Court has opined that "employee resistance" is a "significant check" on an employer's ability to terminate a
pension plan; 69 but the Court did not explain how that resistance

would be manifested or marshaled. An exclusive bargaining agent
would serve to focus and channel that resistance-because pension
benefits are a mandatory bargaining subject and because the duty to
bargain under the Labor Act requires an employer to bargain to impasse before it may implement a change. What remains to be seen is
why employees concerned about their benefits should be given the
Hobson's Choice of only that one model of representation: Why
should a group of employees who desire to be informed of impending
67. See Julius G. Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 916
(1979), and Martha S. West, The Case Against Reinstatement in Wrongful Discharge, 1988 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1, respectively on the significance of unions in the arbitration process, and of a union
presence in the workplace to the effectiveness of the arbitral remedy of reinstatement for wrongful discharge.
68. The cases are collected in 1 HOWARD A. SPECTER & MAT-rHEW W. FINKIN, INDIVID.
UAL EMPLOYMENT LAW AND LIGATION § 1.80, at 153 (1989).

69. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 651 (1990).
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changes in employer benefits and to negotiate over them, and who
notify their employer to that effect, first be required to become the
exclusive bargaining agent of an appropriate bargaining unit?
So, too, of information sharing more generally. The Labor Act
requires an employer to disclose job-related information in its possession necessary for the employees' agent to deal with terms and conditions of employment as well as with employee grievances. But absent
some other law requiring disclosure, an employer need not disclose
that information to unrepresented employees. Some employers, for
example, keep even their supervisory rules governing discipline and
discharge a secret from the employees governed by them. 70 Again, it
remains to be seen why a group of employees who desire to know
what the rules are should be required first to become certified as an
exclusive bargaining representative. Under the instant proposal, all
they need do is submit a membership or subscriber list-and ask to
see the rules. And if they are able to contribute funds sufficient to
retain a lawyer to represent them, there is no reason why their employer should not be required to deal with her.71
In addition, nonmajority representation would have the potential
of being more responsive than is the current system to the growing use
of "contingent" (or "atypical") workers who are hired for short terms
of service and who cannot expect to have a permanent or long term
relationship with any single employer. 72 On the one hand, the expectation of impermanence (and, in some cases, the lack of even a central
workplace for those who are employed to work at home) makes it
difficult if not impossible for these employees to secure representation.73 But on the other hand, these sequential short-term job holders
may be most in need of representation. For example, with the acceleration in job mobility-with the growing reality for many entrants to
the labor market that they cannot expect to have a career with a single
employer for the duration of their working lives-the assumption that
70. This has emerged in litigation on whether the terms so secreted can be contractually
binding on the employer. The prevailing view is that they are not. SPECTER & FINKIN, supra
note 68, § 1.01, at 6 n.11 (1989).
71. The Labor Act speaks in terms of a "representative" designated or selected by the employees. A statutory representative need not be a labor organization. Under existing law, a
majority of a bargaining unit could designate a single person, e.g. a lawyer, as their exclusive

bargaining representative.
72. See generally RICHARD S. BELOus, THE CONTINGENT ECONOMY: THE GROWTH OF THE
TEMPORARY, PART-TIME AND SUBCONTRACTED WORKFORCE (1989).

73. Cf Dorothy S. Cobble, Union Strategies for Organizing and Representing the New Service Workforce, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FoRTY-THIRD ANNUAL MEETING, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION 76 (John F. Burton, Jr. ed., 1991).
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employees will be assured of post-employment income via a single
company's pension plan becomes increasingly unrealistic. The grant
of representational rights to occupationally based organizations that
automatically represent their members, hired even as contingent
workers, and so able to negotiate fully vested and fully portable pen74
sion systems would fill a growing and important need.
This excursion has been unconcerned with the political reality
that any legislative reform is highly unlikely unless it holds some tangible benefit to management and to organized labor, however defensible from the point of view of individual employee freedom of choice.
Nonmajority representation offers a trade-off to both. Labor would
get the benefit of automatic representational rights, but in an arguably
more weakened bargaining position vis-a-vis employers. Management
would not be able to resist collective representation, at least not by
dilatory litigation and election campaigns, but would be given the statutory power to rationalize its bargaining structure under terms that
would seem to concede it a commanding bargaining position in most
cases. This is essentially the trade-off perceived in the debate over
majority rule in 1935 that was acceptable to management but unacceptable to organized labor at that time. It remains to be seen
whether it is politically sufficient today. But if "direct indigenous representation" in the workplace is a social good, should nonmajority
representation not merit consideration?

74. See generally Daniel J.B. Mitchell, Social Insurance and Benefits, in RESEARCH FRONHuMAN RESOURCES 587 (David Lewin et. al. eds., 1992).
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